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Over the past century, Congress has enacted numerous pieces of
legislation designed to clean up our governmental system by lessening
the role "big money" plays in buying influence with government leaders.
In 1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act, which prohibited corpora-
tions from making "a money contribution in connection with any [fed-
eral] election."'  In 1925, Congress extended that prohibition to
"anything of value ' 2 and made it a crime for a candidate to accept cor-
porate contributions.' In 1947, Congress extended this prohibition to
labor organizations and broadened it to cover "expenditures" as well as
contributions.4 Later, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 ("FECA" or "Act"),5 which tightened existing disclosure
rules but loosened the contribution restrictions. The FECA Amend-
ments of 1974 6-largely a response to the extensive abuses aired during
the Watergate hearings-along with further amendments in 1976 and
1979, 7 finally pieced together a comprehensive set of prohibitions, con-
tribution limitations, and disclosure provisions. Through these provi-
sions, Congress sought to "remedy any actual or perceived corruption of
* Scott E. Thomas currently serves as Chairman of the Federal Election Commission. He
earned his B.A. from Stanford University in 1974 and his J.D. from Georgetown University in
1977.
** Jeffrey H. Bowman currently serves as the Executive Assistant to the Chairman. He
earned his B.S. from the University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse in 1976 and his J.D. from George
Washington University in 1979. Ann Puente assisted in writing this article. The opinions in this
article are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Federal Election Commission.
1. Act of Jan. 26, 1907 (Tillman Act), ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864-65 (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 441b (2000)).
2. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, tit. III, § 302(d), 43 Stat. 1070, 1071,
(incorporated into the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 20
(1972)).
3. See id. tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070.
4. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 159
(1947) (amending § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925).
5. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000 &
Supp. 2002)).
6. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263,
partially invalidated by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339
(1980); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475.
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the political process." 8
Over the years though, decisions of the Federal Election Commis-
sion ("FEC" or "Commission") have undercut significant portions of
FECA. Fortunately, these Commission decisions were not the final
word. In 2002, Congress reversed a number of these agency actions
when it passed the McCain-Feingold legislation known more formally as
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA").9 In the post-
BCRA era, however, we already have seen steps by the FEC to clutter
the legal landscape, and it appears that Congress may once again have to
review Commission decisions.
This article considers the role of Congress as a "court of appeals"-
reviewing and reversing decisions of the FEC. In particular, the article
summarizes significant loopholes in the law created by the FEC and the
BCRA response. The article then considers several of the post-BCRA
complications caused by the FEC that may drive Congress to come to
the rescue again. The article concludes that, for the campaign finance
law to work, Congress will have to assume its role as a court of appeals
on an as-needed basis.
II. LOOPHOLES CARVED BY THE FEC AND THEN CLOSED BY BCRA
Congress has "vest[ed] in [the FEC] primary and substantial
responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act."' To this end,
Congress provided the FEC with exclusive jurisdiction for civil enforce-
ment of the Act," including the authority to conduct investigations,
authorize subpoenas, and initiate civil actions to enforce the statute.' 2
The Commission is also empowered to "formulate policy with respect
to" FECA,' 3 and "to make, amend, and repeal such rules . . . as are
necessary to carry out the provisions of [the] Act ... " 4 In addition,
the Commission may issue advisory opinions concerning the application
of the Act and FEC regulations to specific factual situations.' 5
Through the years, however, a number of Commission actions
(either in enforcement matters or regulation) created serious loopholes in
the Act. This section discusses three of those loopholes: the "issue ad"
8. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 14 (1998).
9. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
10. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109 (1976). For a full description of the FEC, see Charles
N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality of Independent Regulatory Agencies Under
the Necessary and Proper Clause: The Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 363 (1987).
11. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(e) (2000). Section 437d contains a full listing of FEC powers. See id.
12. Id. § 437d(a)(3), (6), (9).
13. Id. § 437c(b)(1).
14. Id. § 437d(a)(8); see also id. § 438(a)(8) (Supp. II 2002); id. § 438(d) (2000).
15. See id. §§ 437d(a)(7), 437f.
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loophole, the "coordination" loophole, and the "soft-money" loophole.
This section also discusses how, in 2002, Congress sought to reverse
Commission decisions leading to these loopholes with the passage of
BCRA.
A. The Issue Ad Loophole
In order to ensure that the FECA independent expenditure provi-
sions 16 applied only to "advocacy of a political result" 7 and not pure
"issue discussion,"18 the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 19 construed
these provisions "to reach only funds used for communications that
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candi-
date."20 The Buckley Court explained the purpose of the express advo-
cacy standard was to limit application of the pertinent reporting
provision to "spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of
a particular federal candidate."'" The Court, however, provided no defi-
nition of what constituted "spending that is unambiguously related to the
campaign of a particular federal candidate"22 or "unambiguously cam-
paign related."23 The Buckley Court only indicated, in a footnote, that
express advocacy would include communications containing such obvi-
ous campaign-related words or phrases as "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,'
'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' or
'reject.' "24 After Buckley, Congress amended the Act to incorporate the
express advocacy test in the disclaimer and independent expenditure
reporting rules.25
The significance of the express advocacy test became more appar-
ent in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MFCL),26 when the
16. An independent expenditure is defined as "an expenditure by a person (A) expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's
authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents." Id.
§ 431(17) (2000).
17. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 80 (emphasis added); see also id. at 81 (stating that under an express advocacy
standard, the reporting requirements would "shed the light of publicity on spending that is
unambiguously campaign related . (emphasis added)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 81.
24. Id. at 44 n.52.
25. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 104(d),
90 Stat. 475 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (2000 & Supp. II 2002)); Bipartisan Campaign
Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 211, 311, 116 Stat. 81 (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(17), 441d (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
26. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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Court held that expenditures for corporate (or union) communications
not coordinated with a candidate "must constitute 'express advocacy' in
order to be subject to the prohibition of § 441b."27 The MCFL Court
also affirmed Buckley's understanding that "the 'express advocacy'
requirement [is meant] to distinguish discussion of issues and candidates
from more pointed exhortations to vote for particular persons. ' 28 The
Court explained that express advocacy could be "less direct" than the
examples listed in Buckley so long as the "essential nature" of the com-
munication "goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral
advocacy."29
Obviously, what constituted "express advocacy" became an impor-
tant issue for the FEC. A narrow reading of the term would carve a
significant loophole in FECA and would allow participants in federal
elections to escape the requirements of the law so long as they avoid the
use of certain "magic words" or phrases such as those stated by the
Buckley Court in footnote fifty-two. Under such a loophole, massive
soft-money expenditures disguised as issue ads would render meaning-
less the statute's limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements.
In 1995, the Commission approved a regulation that presents an
alternative to the "magic words" test and recognizes that there is more to
express advocacy than a mere list of words.3 0 The regulation incorpo-
rates the decision of the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Furgatch,3' which
stated that for a communication "to be express advocacy under the Act
...it must, when read as a whole with limited reference to external
events, be susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an
exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate. 32 The FEC regu-
lation defines the term "expressly advocating" as including not only the
Buckley buzzwords but also "any communication that ... taken as a
whole and with limited reference to external events, such as the proxim-
ity to the election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as
containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly
identified candidate(s) . .. .""
Unfortunately, both before and after passage of this regulation, half
the Commissioners of the FEC have read express advocacy so narrowly
27. Id. at 249.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Expressly Advocating, 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (2005).
31. 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
32. Id. at 864. In the "Explanation and Justification" of the regulation, the Commission stated
that subsection (b) of the regulation reflected the analysis of Buckley's express advocacy
requirement articulated in Furgatch. Express Advocacy; Independent Expenditures; Corporate
Labor Organization Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,292, 35,295 (July 6, 1995).
33. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b).
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when confronted with specific facts that the express advocacy standard
has become meaningless. Over the years, the Commission has repeat-
edly split 3-3 on whether to find express advocacy in a number of
enforcement actions. In many of these cases, there was little doubt that
the communication was intended to advocate the election or defeat of a
particular candidate. For example, in Matter Under Review ("MUR")
3162, the Commission split 3-3 over whether a 1990 flyer, comparing
candidates in various federal races and rating some "very bad" and some
"excellent," was express advocacy.34
Similarly, MUR 3376 involved a 1990 newspaper ad featuring a
picture of the candidate speaking in a dynamic manner before a large
attentive audience. 35 Appearing above the picture, in large prominent
letters, was the candidate's name. 36 Below the picture were the words
"CARING-FIGHTING-WINNING. 37 The ad was paid for by the can-
didate's campaign committee.38 Once again, the Commission split on
whether this was issue discussion or express advocacy.
Likewise, at issue in MUR 4922 was an October 1998 communica-
tion distributed by the Suburban O'Hare Commission ("SOC") that
urged voters to vote on Election Day.40 The communication argued that
it was essential to have an official in Congress who supported the SOC
position on airport expansion, and then identified that official as Con-
gressman Henry Hyde.4 In this matter, the Commission also split on
whether this constituted express advocacy.42
Perhaps one of the most egregious examples of express advocacy
was the communication at issue in MUR 4568.43 The matter involved
the following 1996 television ad made during a congressional campaign:
34. Citizens for Informed Voting in the Commonwealth, Federal Election Commission Matter
Under Review 3162, First General Counsel's Report at 2 n.1 (May 21, 1991), microformed on
FEC Office of Public Records microfilm location 91-OGC-085-0040, 92-OGC-087-1682, 91-
OGC-087-1682.
35. Studds for Congress Committee, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review
3376, First General Counsel's Report at 2-3 (Mar. 4, 1992), microformed on FEC Office of Public






40. Suburban O'Hare Comm'n, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review 4922,
Complaint at 1288 (Aug. 23, 1999), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.comeqsdocs/000024C3.pdf.
41. See id. at 1289-91.
42. Compare id. at 1852 (Chairman Darryl R. Wold's Statement of Reasons Dec. 8, 2000),
available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000024CD.pdf, with id. at 1855 (Comm'rs David M.
Mason's and Bradley A. Smith's Statement of Reasons Dec. 8, 2000), available at http://eqs.
sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000024CD.pdf.
43. Rick Hill for Congress Committee, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review
2006]
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Who is Bill Yellowtail?
He preaches family values, but he takes a swing at his wife.
Yellowtail's explanation?
He only slapped her, but her nose was not broken.
He talks law and order, but is himself a convicted criminal.
And though he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail failed to
make his own child support payments.
Then voted against child support enforcement.
Call Bill Yellowtail and tell him you don't approve of his wrongful
behavior.44
Once again, however, the Commission split on whether this constituted
express advocacy.45
More recently, the Commission considered ads run by Republicans
for Clean Air in MUR 4982.46 In early March 2000, less than one week
before the 'Super Tuesday' primaries, advertisements began running in
three of the most important primary states-California, New York, and
Ohio. Opening with a picture of presidential candidate John McCain
superimposed over smokestacks belching dirty air, the New York adver-
tisement was described in a script as follows:
Visuals/On Screen Copy:
McCain photo over pollution
McCain Voted Against Clean Energy
Paid for by Republicans for Clean Air
Audio:
Last year, John McCain voted against solar and renewable energy.47
That means more use of coal-burning plants that pollute our air.
Visuals/On Screen Copy:
New York skyline with Statue of Liberty
Bush name with sky: Bush
Audio:
New York Republicans care about clean air.
So does Governor Bush.
Visuals/On Screen Copy:
Smokestacks with clear dawn
Bush Clamped Down On Polluters
4568, Comm'rs Scott E. Thomas' and Danny Lee McDonald's Statement of Reasons (Oct. 3,
2002) (on file with FEC Press Office).
44. Id. at 2-3.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Bush for President, Inc., Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review 4982, First
General Counsel's Report at 3599 (Dec. 20, 2001).
47. Vote #171, S.1186, June 16, 1999.
[Vol. 60:201
CONGRESS AS A COURT OF APPEALS
Audio:
He led one of the first states in America to clamp down on old, coal-
burning electric power plants.48
Visuals/On Screen Copy:
Bush photo over green field
Bush Signed Clean Air Laws
Audio:
Bush clean air laws will reduce air pollution more than a quarter mil-
lion tons a year.4 9
Visuals/On Screen Copy:
Young people with canoe
Audio:
That's like taking five million cars off the road.
Visuals/On Screen Copy:
Bush name with kids: Let Bush & McCain Know You Back Clean
Energy
Audio:
Governor Bush. Leading ... so each day dawns brighter5"
Despite the timing of the ad, its placement in only three crucial primary
states, its one-sided comparison of the two leading candidates for the
2000 Republican Presidential nomination, and the fact that the ad was
addressed only to "Republicans" who were about to vote in the three
primary states, e.g., "New York Republicans care about clean air," the
FEC did not consider this to be "express advocacy."'"
In 2002, Congress came to the rescue and largely closed the issue
48. Texas Senate Bill 7, signed June 18, 1999; Texas Senate Bill 766, signed June 18, 1999.
49. State of Texas, Office of the Governor, www.governor.state.tx.us/environmental/
emissions.html.
50. Rick Hill for Congress Committee, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review
4568, Comm'rs Scott E. Thomas' and Danny Lee McDonald's Statement of Reasons (Apr. 24,
2002) (footnotes omitted), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/00000127.pdf.
51. Id. at 3628 (Certification of Commission Secretary) (Jan. 23, 2002). There have been still
other examples of FEC deadlocks over express advocacy. For example, in Nita Lowey for
Congress, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review 3616, Certification of Commission
Secretary (Oct. 20, 1993), microformed on FEC Office of Public Records microfilm location 94-
OGC-356-0990, 94-OGC-354-4610, 94-OGC-352-2667, 94-OGC-358-5116, the Commission
failed to find express advocacy in an advertisement featuring the candidate's name, picture, and
campaign slogan that was paid for by the candidate's campaign committee and published during
the month before the election. See also Americans for Tax Reform, Federal Election Commission
Matter Under Review 4204, Certification of Commission Secretary (Apr. 24, 1995), microformed
on FEC Office of Public Records microfilm location 96-OGC-376-3058, 97-OGC-377-2938, 96-
OGC-377-2594; Clyde Evans, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review 3678,
Certification of Commission Secretary (Jan. 28, 1994), microformed on FEC Office of Public
Records microfilm location 94-OGC-097-2234, 94-OGC-097-4110, 94-OGC-097-3240; Christian
Coalition, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review 3167/3176, Certification of
20061
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ad loophole created by the Commission. Signed into law on March 27,
2002,52 BCRA sought to lessen reliance on the express advocacy test
and, instead, require the use of federally permissible funds to pay for
certain issue ads that run near the election of the candidates mentioned
in the ads. Specifically, BCRA created a new term of art, "election-
eering communication," which is defined as:
[A]ny broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which-
(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office;
(II) is made within-
(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for
the office sought by the candidate; or
(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a
convention or caucus of a political party that has authority
to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candi-
date; and
(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate
for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted
to the relevant electorate.53
Electioneering communications by corporations, unions, and other enti-
ties covered by 2 U.S.C. § 441b are prohibited.54 By treating such
"issue ads" running within 30 days of a primary election or within 60
days of a general election as campaign ads, Congress invoked its power
to prevent commercial aggregations of wealth from overwhelming the
political marketplace and driving average citizens away.55
In McConnell v. FEC,56 the Supreme Court upheld the "election-
Commission Secretary (Mar. 29, 1992), microformed on FEC Office of Public Records microfilm
location 92-OGC-090-0851, 92-OGC-090-0542.
Meanwhile, a few courts were not exactly helping to close the loophole either. Three
separate circuit courts of appeals struck down the 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) approach, finding that
something approximating magic words must be present to constitute express advocacy. See Va.
Soc'y for Human Life v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2001); Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v.
Williams, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963
(8th Cir. 1999) (ruling on an identical state-level regulation).
52. Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 2356, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 517 (Mar. 27, 2002).
53. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. II 2002). A communication is "targeted to the relevant
electorate" if it "can be received by 50,000 or more persons" in the House district or State the
House or Senate candidate seeks to represent. Id. § 434(f)(3)(C).
54. Id. § 441b(c) (2000). Under §44 1b, it is unlawful for a corporation or a union to make a
"contribution or expenditure in connection with" a federal election. Id. §441b(a) (2000). The
term "contribution or expenditure" now includes "any direct or indirect payment, distribution,
loan, advance, deposit, or gift" for "any applicable electioneering communication." Id.
§ 441b(b)(2) (Supp. 112002). The latter term includes not only those made by the entities covered
by § 441b, but also those made "by any other person using funds donated by an entity [covered by
§ 1]." Id. § 441b(c)(1) (2000).
55. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256-59 (1986).
56. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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eering communication" provisions of BCRA.57 In so ruling, the Court
forcefully pointed out the uselessness of the "magic words" test used by
the Commission on so many prior occasions:
[T]he unmistakable lesson .. is that [the] magic-words requirement
is functionally meaningless. Not only can advertisers easily evade
the line by eschewing the use of magic words, but they would seldom
choose to use such words even if permitted. And although the result-
ing advertisements do not urge the viewer to vote for or against a
candidate in so many words, they are no less clearly intended to
influence the election."
Rejecting this approach, the Court stated: "[The] express advocacy line,
in short, has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent
corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found in
the existing system."59
B. The Coordination Loophole
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld limits on contributions to
federal candidates, but ruled that a similar limitation on independent
expenditures by individuals or political action committees (PACs) was
unconstitutional.6" The Court found that the absence of prearrangement
or coordination of an expenditure "alleviates the danger that expendi-
tures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from
the candidate."'" The Court recognized, however, the importance of the
coordination concept. If a would-be spender could pay for a television
advertisement requested by a candidate, for example, this "coordination"
would convert what might have appeared to be an "independent" expen-
diture into nothing more than a disguised contribution. Indeed, the
Buckley Court warned that the contribution limitations would become
meaningless if they could be evaded "by the simple expedient of paying
directly for media advertisements or for other portions of the candidate's
campaign activities."62
In order to "prevent attempts to circumvent the Act through prear-
ranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contribu-
tions," the Buckley Court treated "coordinated expenditures . . . as
contributions rather than expenditures." 63 Thus, the Buckley Court drew
57. Id.
58. Id. at 193-94 (emphasis added) (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
59. Id. at 194.
60. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
61. Id. at 47.
62. Id. at 46. For a full discussion of what constitutes "coordination," see Scott E. Thomas &
Jeffrey H. Bowman, Coordinated Expenditure Limits: Can They Be Saved?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV.
133 (1999).
63. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47.
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a specific distinction between expenditures made "totally independently
of the candidate and his campaign" and "coordinated expenditures"
which could be constitutionally regulated.6 The Court defined "contri-
bution" to "include not only contributions made directly or indirectly to
a candidate, political party, or campaign committee . . .but also all
expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candi-
date, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate. 65
Congress adopted the Buckley standard as part of the FECA
Amendments of 1976.66 Concerned that independent expenditures could
be used to circumvent the contribution limitations, Congress preserved
the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between those expenditures
that are "totally independent" of the candidate's campaign and those that
are not. The statute squarely states that an expenditure made "in cooper-
ation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a
candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be
considered to be a contribution to such candidate," and thus subject to
the contribution limitations.67 Moreover, § 431(17) of the statute
defines "independent expenditure" as:
[A]n expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without cooper-
ation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized commit-
tee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with,
or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized
committee or agent of such candidate.68
The FEC adopted the Buckley standard in former § 109.1 (b)(4)(i) of the
Commission's regulations.6 9 This provision explained that an expendi-
ture will not be considered independent if there is "[a]ny arrangement,
coordination, or direction by the candidate or his ... agent prior to the
publication, distribution, display, or broadcast of the communication."7
The regulation further stated that an expenditure is presumed not to be
independent if it was "[b]ased on information about the candidate's
plans, projects, or needs provided to the expending person by the candi-
date, or by the candidate's agents, with a view toward having an expen-
diture made."'"
In December of 2000, however, the Commission passed new regu-
64. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
66. Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 320, 90 Stat. 475, 487-88 (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (2000)).
67. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i).
68. Id. § 431(17) (2000) (emphasis added).
69. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(4)(i) (2000).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 109.1(b)(4)(i)(A) (emphasis added).
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lations undercutting the concept of coordination. 2 The Commission
based these regulations upon the decision of a single district court in
FEC v. Christian Coalition,73 which effectively created its own defini-
tion of coordination. The district court seemed to require either a
request or suggestion from the candidate's operatives, exercise of con-
trol over the communication by the candidate's operatives, or "substan-
tial discussion or negotiation between the campaign and the spender
over[ ] a communication's: (1) contents; (2) timing; (3) location, mode,
or intended audience ... ; or (4) 'volume' . . . ."I Oddly, the Commis-
sion did not appeal the lower court's decision.75 Rather, four members
of the Commission embraced the decision and passed new coordination
regulations based upon it.
7 6
These new regulations greatly narrowed the Act's definition of con-
tribution and opened substantial loopholes diminishing its effect. By
tapering the circumstances under which an expenditure is considered
"coordinated" to only those instances in which the candidate or commit-
tee has "request[ed] or suggest[ed]," "exercised control or decision-mak-
ing authority," or had "substantial discussion or negotiation" that
resulted in "collaboration or agreement, '77 the regulation excluded those
situations in which a communication was "based on" information a cam-
paign provided "with a view toward having an expenditure made. 78
Such a limited approach rendered the coordination standard-and thus,
the contribution limits-largely ineffective. In the real world, would-be
spenders find ways to inform and get implicit consent without "collabo-
rating" or "agreeing" on the details.
Once again, Congress was forced to come to the rescue. Recogniz-
ing the loophole created by these regulations, section 214 of BCRA
repealed the Commission's narrow definition of coordination and
72. General Public Political Communications Coordinated with Candidates and Party
Committees; Independent Expenditures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,138 (Dec. 6, 2000) (codified at 11 C.F.R.
pts. 100, 109, and 110).
73. 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999).
74. Id. at 92.
75. The decision of a single district court certainly cannot and should not resolve such an
important issue as coordination. Indeed, the decision of the district court in Christian Coalition is
not binding precedent on any other federal court, even in the same district. See, e.g., In re Korean
Air Line Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Binding precedent for all [circuits is]
set only by the Supreme Court, and for the district courts within a circuit, only by the court of
appeals for that circuit.").
76. General Public Political Communications Coordinated with Candidates and Party
Committees; Independent Expenditures, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,138 ("The Commission is
promulgating new rules at II CFR 100.23 that define the term coordinated general public political
communication. They generally follow the standard articulated by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in the Christian Coalition decision." (citation omitted)).
77. 11 C.F.R. § 100.23(c) (2001).
78. 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(4)(i)(A) (2000).
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instructed the Commission to "promulgate new regulations on coordi-
nated communications paid for by persons other than candidates, author-
ized committees of candidates, and party committees."79 Section 214
specifically stated that any new coordination regulations "shall not
require agreement on formal collaboration to establish coordination."8
As explained by Senator Feingold, the "collaboration or agreement"
standard "would miss many cases of coordination that result from de
facto understandings."'" Rejecting the Commission's narrow definition
of coordination, Senator McCain similarly explained:
Informal understandings and de facto arrangements can result in
actual coordination as effectively as explicit agreement or formal col-
laboration. In drafting new regulations to implement the existing
statutory standard for coordination-an expenditure made "in coop-
eration, consultation or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion
of' a candidate-we expect the FEC to cover "coordination" when-
ever it occurs, not simply when there has been an agreement or for-
mal collaboration.82
C. The Soft-Money Loophole
Early on, the FEC took a very hard line on the use of soft money83
for registration and get-out-the-vote activity (GOTV). For example, in
Advisory Opinion 1976-72, the FEC held that "even though the Illinois
law apparently permits corporate contributions for State elections, cor-
porate or union treasury funds may not be used to defray any portion of
a registration or get-out-the-vote drive conducted by a political party."8 4
Thus, the Commission found that this type of activity had to be paid for
entirely with hard dollars. The FEC reached a similar result later that
year in Advisory Opinion 1976-83.85
The party soft-money loophole began with a 1978 advisory opinion
by the FEC that allowed a state party to fund a reasonable "non-federal"
share of party building expenses, like voter registration or GOTV, with
whatever funds state law allowed.86 In so ruling in Advisory Opinion
79. Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
§ 214, 116 Stat. 81, 94-95.
80. Id.
81. 148 CONG. REC. S2096, S2145 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
82. Id. (statement of Sen. McCain).
83. The phrase "soft money" commonly refers to funds that cannot be contributed to a federal
candidate or political committee under the Act. These funds include: contributions in excess of
certain limits, 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2000 & Supp. II 2002); corporate and labor contributions, id.
§ 441b; and contributions by foreign nationals in federal, state, and local elections, id. § 441e.
84. CCH, FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANCE GUIDE 6934 (1976) (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 6936.
86. Id. at $ 5340.
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1978-10, the Commission overturned Advisory Opinion 1976-72 and
Advisory Opinion 1976-83, and allowed corporate and union funds to be
used for the portion of costs allocated to the party committee's non-
federal account. In Advisory Opinion 1979-17, the FEC extended this
allowance to national party committees so that they could also allocate a
portion of their activity as "non-federal," and pay for that share with
money raised in states with laws permitting the use of federally prohib-
ited funds.8 7 Underlying the allocation approach developed in these two
advisory opinions was a recognition that the efforts of political parties-
particularly the state and local parties-often involved generic party-
building activity designed to help both federal and non-federal
candidates.
Congress essentially ratified this "allocation" approach as part of
the 1979 FECA Amendments. With regard to certain provisions
allowing more flexibility for state and local parties, Congress indicated
that "if State law allows the use of treasury funds of a corporation, that
money could be used for the State portion, but not for any portion allo-
cable to Federal candidates."88 During the early years of allocation, par-
ties made slight use of soft money. The FEC, however, only required
that any formula used by a party committee be "reasonable. ' 89 It didn't
take long for party committees to push the envelope by allocating their
expenses in a way that allowed the vast majority to be paid with soft
money.
Beginning with the 1992 election cycle, the FEC attempted to slow
down this pattern of evasion with regulations that required party com-
mittees to use specific allocation formulas.9" For example, the two
national party committees were required to allocate sixty-five percent of
their party-building costs as federal expenditures in presidential election
years, leaving only thirty-five percent that could be paid with soft
money.91 State and local parties, though, were allowed to work with a
"ballot composition" formula whereby the number of federal candidates
on the ballot was divided by the number of all candidates to achieve a
federal percentage.9 z In most states, the federal share ranged around
87. Id. at 1 5416.
88. H.R. REP. No. 96-422, at 8 (1979).
89. In the 1977 regulations, the FEC required political committees active in federal and non-
federal elections to allocate their administrative expenses between federal and non-federal
accounts "in proportion to the amount of funds expended on federal and non-federal elections, or
on another reasonable basis." II C.F.R. § 106.1(e) (1977) (emphasis added); see also 55 Fed.
Reg. 26,058, 26,059 (June 26, 1990).
90. See Methods of Allocating Between Federal and Non-Federal Accounts; Payments;
Reporting, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,058 (June 26, 1990) (codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 102, 104, and 106).
91. Id. at 26,063.
92. Id. at 26,064.
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twenty-five percent, thus leaving the rest of the. expenditures payable
with soft money.93 These final rules were issued in 1990 and became
effective on January 1, 1991. 94
The 1990 soft-money regulations, however, formalized a loophole
massively exploited over succeeding years. As one court concluded:
"From 1991 until BCRA went into effect... party committees routinely
circumvented the spirit of campaign finance laws in order to use soft
money to influence federal elections .... -9" Indeed, reports filed with
the FEC indicate a dramatic rise in soft-money spending by party com-
mittees. In the 1992 election cycle, national party committees reported
spending $79 million in soft money; in the 1996 election cycle, national
party committees reported spending over $271 million in soft money;
and in the 2000 election cycle, national party committees reported
spending $497 million in soft money-more than a six-fold increase.96
As the above numbers indicate, the use of soft money dramatically
increased during the 1996 and 2000 election cycles. By 1996, party
operatives had figured out that transferring available soft money to the
state parties would allow for much more soft money to be spent for
party-building activity. In the 2000 election cycle, huge amounts of soft
money were raised by elected officials for the national parties and then
transferred down to state parties for ads promoting or attacking particu-
lar federal candidates. The FEC tracked about $150 million in soft
money transferred by national committees of the Democratic Party to
state or local party committees and about $130 million transferred by the
national committees of the Republican Party to state or local party com-
mittees. 97 These transfers represented large portions of the approxi-
mately $250 million in soft money raised by each of the national party
structures.98 The spectacle of presidential and congressional candidates
and officeholders openly soliciting huge soft-money donations, clearly
targeted at federal races, left the FECA provisions in tatters.
In 1996, the Democratic National Committee and the Republican
National Committee further stretched the law by using the allocation
allowance to subsidize, with soft money, massive expenditures for ads in
support of President Clinton and Bob Dole, respectively.9 9 Both presi-
93. See, e.g., Retroactive Application of Revised Ballot Composition Record, FEC RECORD
(FEC, Washington, D.C.), July 1992, at 3-4.
94. 55 Fed. Reg. 40,377 (Oct. 3, 1990).
95. Emily's List v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2005).
96. Press Release, FEC, FEC Reports Increase in Party Fundraising for 2000 (May 15, 2001)




99. See Dole for President, Inc., Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review 4969,
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dential campaigns recognized that their parties' issue advertisements
played an important role in their campaigns.' Indeed, as Senator Dole
candidly admitted:
"We had to spend a lot of money to win the nomination... [b]ut we
can, through the Republican National Committee.. . run television
ads and other advertising. It's called generic. It's not Bob Dole for
President. In fact, there's an ad running now, hopefully in Orlando, a
60 second spot about the Bob Dole story: Who is Bob Dole? What's
he all about?"'10 '
Similarly, it appeared the Clinton campaign sought to use the Demo-
cratic National Committee to advance its campaign. For example, in
notes regarding a campaign meeting, presidential advisor and consultant
Dick Morris wrote: "Total Clinton Gore Money through May 28: $2.5
million . . . If Dole is nominated we need no additional CG [Clinton-
Gore] money for media before May 28 since we can attack him with
DNC money.
' °2
The FEC split on whether to pursue these 1996 advertising cam-
paigns as 100% federal outlays.103 Several Commissioners argued that
the law was unsettled and that these ads were simply issue ads that could
be treated like generic party-building activity.'0 4 As a result, several
election cycles of profligate soft-money spending for hard-hitting, candi-
date-specific ads drifted by with no response from the FEC. In failing to
pursue these matters, the FEC missed a clear opportunity to put the
brakes on the massive amounts of soft money raised and spent for party
First General Counsel's Report at 27, n.28 (Jan. 12, 2000), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqs
docs/00002664.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Clinton/Gore '96 Primary Committee, Federal Election Commission Matter Under
Review 4713, First General Counsel's Report (Jan. 12, 2000), available at http://egs.sdrdc.coml
egsdocs//2004399.0611 at 39 (emphasis added).
103. The 1996 cases included Dole for President, Federal Election Commission Matter Under
Review 4553 (Jan. 12, 2000), microfonned on FEC Office of Public Records microfilm location
20-OGC-400-0002, 20-OGC-399-1622, 20-OGC-399-3101; Dole for President, Federal Election
Commission Matter Under Review 4671 (Jan. 12, 2000), microfonned on FEC Office of Public
Records microfilm location 20-OGC-401-0002, 20-OGC-399-1641, 20-OGC-399-3129; Dole for
President, Inc., Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review 4969 (Jan. 12, 2000),
available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/00002664.pdf; Dole for President, Federal Election
Commission Matter Under Review 4970 (Jan. 12, 2000), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqs
docs/0000266D.pdf; Clinton/Gore '96 Primary Committee, Federal Election Commission Matter
Under Review 4407 (Jan. 12, 2000), microformed on FEC Office of Public Records microfilm
location 20-OGC-398-0915, 20-OGC-399-3045, 20-OGC-399-1584. Because four affirmative
votes are needed to make a determination, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2) (2000), no action was taken with
regard to these matters.
104. See, e.g., Clinton/Gore '96 Primary Committee, Inc., Federal Election Commission Matter
Under Review 4713, Comm'rs Statements of Reasons (Jan. 12, 2000), available at http://eqs.
sdrdc.com (select "Case Type" MUR, and enter 4713 in "Case #" box).
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ads clearly promoting a particular candidate. Had the Commission
voted to treat those 1996 cycle ads as violations, there would not have
been the flood of soft money for similar party "issue ads" in subsequent
election cycles and, perhaps, no need for BCRA.
Congress rescued the FEC from the soft-money morass with
BCRA, as it did with respect to the "issue ad" and "coordination" loop-
holes created by the FEC. In light of the history of the 1992 through
2000 election cycles, "Congress determined that the allocation system in
fact enabled the circumvention of the law by authorizing the spending of
soft money on activities that were intended to, and in fact did, influence
federal campaigns."' 5 In order to remedy the party soft-money abuses
sanctioned by the FEC regulatory scheme, BCRA prohibits national
party committees from raising any funds other than those permissible for
federal elections. 10 6 Specifically, it states that "[a] national committee
of a political party . . . may not solicit, receive, or direct to another
person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of
value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibi-
tions, and reporting requirements of [FECA]."'' 7
To prevent the funneling of funds through state or local party com-
mittees, BCRA also requires state and local party committees to treat
certain expenses as "[f]ederal election activity" and to use only federally
permissible contributions, or an allocation of federally permissible con-
tributions and donations of $10,000 or less allowed under State law to
pay such expenses.' 018 To insulate federal candidates and officeholders
from soft money, BCRA prevents them from soliciting in connection
with elections any funds that would not be permissible under federal
law.'0 9 Finally, anticipating possible loopholes in the party soft-money
restrictions, BCRA extends the reach of several provisions to any
"agent" of a party committee, federal candidate, or federal officeholder
and to "any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed,
maintained, or controlled by" such party committee, federal candidate,
or federal officeholder." 0 BCRA also requires that "federal election
activity" must be paid for with funds each committee raises itself, to
prevent party committees, that can freely raise corporate or union funds
or large donations under State law, from transferring such funds to other
party committees." 1'
105. Emily's List v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2005).
106. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 441i(b)(1), (2)(B)(iii).
109. Id. § 441i(e)(1).
110. Id. § 441i(a)(2), (b)(1), (e)(l).
111. Id. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv).
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In McConnell, the Supreme Court upheld Congress's effort,
through BCRA, to "plug the soft-money loophole."' 1 2 The Supreme
Court found that "there is substantial evidence.., that large soft-money
contributions ... give rise to corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion.""' 3 The Court recognized that BCRA was enacted "to address
Congress' concerns about the increasing use of soft money" to "influ-
ence federal elections.""'  The Court stated that "[b]oth common sense
and the ample record in these cases confirm Congress' belief that ...
large soft-money contributions to national party committees have a cor-
rupting influence or give rise to the appearance of corruption.""' 5 The
Court found that "[b]ecause voter registration, voter identification,
GOTV, and generic campaign activity all confer substantial benefits on
federal candidates, the funding of such activities creates a significant
risk of actual and apparent corruption." '116
In upholding BCRA, the Supreme Court faulted the FEC for its
administration of the law and laid the creation of the soft-money prob-
lem squarely on the FEC's doorstep. The Court pointed out that the
FEC's pre-BCRA soft-money rules "permitted more than Congress, in
enacting FECA, had ever intended," and that the rules "invited wide-
spread circumvention" of the statute." 7 In the Court's view:
[t]he main goal of [the BCRA soft-money prohibition] is modest. In
large part, it simply effects a return to the scheme that was approved
in Buckley and that was subverted by the creation of the FEC's allo-
cation regime, which permitted the political parties to fund federal
electioneering efforts with a combination of hard and soft money." 8
Unfortunately, passage of BCRA did not put an end to the FEC's consis-
tent failure to follow congressional intent.
III. THE FEC REGULATIONS "IMPLEMENTING" BCRA
WEAKENED THE STATUTE AND MAY REQUIRE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AGAIN
Having passed BCRA, Congress expressly charged the FEC with
the responsibility for promulgating new regulations to implement the
statutory language. Specifically, section 402(c)(2) of BCRA required
112. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 133 (2003).
113. Id. at 154.
114. Id. at 132.
115. Id. at 145.
116. Id. at 168.
117. Id. at 142, 145; accord Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("Charged with
administering federal campaign finance laws, the Federal Election Commission .. . took a
permissive view.").
118. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added).
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the FEC to promulgate rules within 90 days of BCRA's enactment to
carry out the provisions restricting the use of soft money by political
party committees." 9 Section 402(c)(1) of BCRA required the FEC to
promulgate, within 270 days of its enactment, the remaining regulations
required to carry out BCRA.120 Although the FEC met the temporal
requirements of BCRA,12' the regulations passed by the Commission
failed to meet the spirit of the new law. As Senator Feingold put it:
"The FEC met the deadlines, but not our expectations. Time after time,
the FEC opened loopholes or potential loopholes rather than trying to
faithfully discern the intent of the law. It acted as a super legislature,
substituting its policy judgments for those of the Congress."' 22
A. Examples of FEC Regulations that Weakened BCRA
In upholding virtually all of BCRA's provisions in McConnell, the
Supreme Court observed that "BCRA's central provisions are designed
to address Congress' concerns about the increasing use of soft money
and issue advertising to influence federal elections."' 23 Despite this
clear congressional intent, the FEC passed a number of implementing
regulations that, in the professed interest of "providing clarity," plainly
undercut BCRA. In particular, it is useful to look at the way in which
these regulations rolled back BCRA reforms in the areas of issue ads,
coordination, and soft money.
With respect to issue ads, the new FEC regulations improperly nar-
rowed the reach of the statute. For example, in defining an election-
eering communication (targeted broadcast ads mentioning a candidate
within 30/60 days of an election), 24 the Commission created a flat
exemption for 501(c)(3) groups, 25 on the assumption that the IRS ade-
quately would police this activity. This means incorporated 501(c)
groups, or those that accept funds prohibited by FECA, do not have to
worry about FEC oversight unless they trip over other rules, such as the
coordinated communication or express advocacy restraints. Signifi-
cantly, the only exemption authority granted to the FEC in BCRA is for
activity that does not promote, support, attack, or oppose the named fed-
119. Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
§ 402(c)(2), 116 Stat. 81, 113.
120. Id. § 402(c)(1).
121. See Prohibited and Excessive Contributions: Non-Federal Funds or Soft Money, 67 Fed.
Reg. 49,064 (July 29, 2002); Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,190 (Oct. 23,
2002); Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421 (Jan. 3, 2003).
122. 149 CONG. REC. S9248 (daily ed. July 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
123. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 132.
124. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
125. 11 C.F.R § 100.29(c)(6) (2005).
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eral candidate. 126
For the coordination rules, the Commission adopted a complicated
new "content" plus "conduct" standard whereby ads that do not meet a
content test can be fully coordinated with a candidate without causing
the ads to qualify as an in-kind contribution. 27 Even though Congress
clearly directed the FEC to get tougher in this area, the new regulations
broadly exempt from the limits, prohibitions, and contribution reporting
provisions fully coordinated communications that run more than 120
days before the election as long as they avoid express advocacy or the
direct re-publication of campaign materials issued by a candidate.
1 28
Essentially, unless there is express advocacy, ads that run more than 120
days from an election will not meet the "content" test. As a result, even
ads that promote, support, attack, or oppose a candidate can be created
and fully controlled by a candidate and yet be paid for without limit by a
party committee, corporation, union, or even a foreign government. One
can only imagine the attack ads paid for by such sources and orches-
trated with a candidate in an early primary state between a March pri-
mary and early July, up until the beginning of the 120-day period before
the general election. Consequently, candidate and party operatives find
themselves indebted to the wealthy interest groups, individuals, or orga-
nizations that are willing to pay without limit for ads planned, created,
and coordinated with candidates just outside the 120-day timeframe.
Obviously, the potential for quid pro quo arrangements is great.1 29 It is
unlikely that this is what Congress had in mind when it overturned the
FEC's coordination regulations as too lenient.
130
126.,2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(iv) (Supp. II 2002).
127. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21.(a)(1)-(3) (2005) (providing that a communication is coordinated
with a candidate, an authorized committee, a political party committee, or an agent of any of the
foregoing if the communication: (1) is paid for by a third party; (2) satisfies at least one of four
"content" standards; and (3) satisfies at least one of six "conduct" standards).
128. See id. §§ 109.21(c)(4))(i)-(iii), 109.37(a)(2)(iii)(A)-(C).
129. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) ("The absence of prearrangement and
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of
the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate."). By placing candidate approved
communications running only a few months before the general election outside the limitations,
prohibitions and reporting provisions of FECA, § 109.21 ignores this important teaching of
Buckley.
130. Moreover, regardless of when made, a communication that avoids reference to a
particular candidate or party can avoid treatment as an in-kind contribution. For example, a
corporation could pay for an ad written by a candidate that says, "Do we need a liar, tax cheat, and
wife-beater in Congress?"
The Commission had much better alternatives before it when considering the "coordinated
communication" regulations. It could have kept the approach that worked fairly well for most of
the FEC's history: analyzing whether the coordinated message was an "expenditure"-or "for the
purpose of influencing" or "in connection with" a federal election-under the law. See 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431(9)(A)(i), 441a(a)(7)(B)(i), 441b(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. II 2000); see also FEC Advisory Op.
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Additionally, the FEC completely exempted from the coordination
rules communications using the Internet. It did this by using the term
"public communications" in the "content" provisions, and exempting
Internet communications from this term.131
For provisions preventing state party use of soft money for "Federal
Election Activity," the FEC found several ways to narrow the definition
of Federal Election Activity. This freed state parties to use significantly
more soft money to pay for allocable expenses. For example, with
respect to Voter ID, GOTV, and generic campaign activity "in connec-
tion with an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on
the ballot," the FEC narrowed the applicable time frame to the period
beginning with the filing deadline in each state. 132 Thus, in non-presi-
dential years in late primary states, the restrictions do not take effect
until July of the election year.' 33  Particularly for Voter ID activity,
which is ongoing throughout the election cycle, this allows significant
party activity to be partly subsidized using whatever soft money state
law allows.
Moreover, the Commission defined Voter ID to exclude altogether
the costs of acquiring lists and updating contact information.' 34 So,
even within the time frame just noted, significant Voter ID expenses are
excluded from the Federal Election Activity restraints. And, as with the
coordination rules, the FEC exempted from the Federal Election Activity
definition "public communications" using Internet formats.'
35
In addition to rolling back BCRA reforms in the areas of issue ads,
coordination, and soft money, the FEC created other loopholes. For pro-
visions preventing federal candidates and officeholders from soliciting
soft money, the FEC adopted a definition of solicitation that requires
No. 1982-56 (Oct. 29, 1982) (explaining that non-Federal candidate ad containing endorsement by
Federal candidate not an "expenditure"), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/820056.html;
FEC Advisory Op. No.1996-11 (May 20, 1996) (explaining that candidate appearance at non-
profit corporation event not an "expenditure"), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/960011.
html. In the alternative, the Commission could have adopted a "content standard" whereby only
messages that promote or support or attack or oppose a named candidate would be covered by the
coordination rules. Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,042, 60,049
(proposed Sept. 24, 2002). Either one of these approaches would have been far superior to the
odd results flowing from the 120-days or reference-to-candidate rule.
131. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(2)-(4).
132. Id. § 100.24(a)(1)(i) (2005).
133. For 2006, there are 13 states or territories with a July, August, or September filing
deadline. See Federal Election Commission, 2006 U.S. Congressional Primary Dates and
Candidate Filing Deadlines For Ballot Access (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2006/
2006pdates.pdf.
134. 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(4).
135. Id. §§ 100.24(b)(3), 100.26.
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one "to ask that another person make a contribution."'' 36 Suggesting that
a person make a soft-money contribution, however, is not a solicita-
tion. 137 It is not difficult to imagine conversations such as, "it would be
really nice if you could give the party $1 million," or "you're the only
person I've talked to today who hasn't committed to giving the party
$250,000. How does that make you feel?" Effectively, the Commission
may have created a "magic words" test for the BCRA solicitation
restrictions.
For the soft-money-solicitation restrictions, which also apply to
"agents" of national party committees, candidates, and officeholders, the
FEC adopted a "two hat theory" whereby a person who is an agent of
such a person for purposes of raising hard money may raise soft money
as a separate individual. 138  Thus, the application of the soft-money
restriction becomes a matter of proving that the agent was acting on
behalf of the federal candidate when raising soft money. This will pro-
mote the use of paper "agency agreements" (e.g., "I only authorize Mau-
rice Stans to raise 'hard money"'), so that many of the same old faces
tied to federal candidates can continue to raise soft money.139
B. Shays v. FEC Challenges the Commission
On October 8, 2002, Representatives Shays and Meehan filed an
action against the FEC challenging a number of the Commission's regu-
lations "implementing" BCRA. 40 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that
"the FEC's new regulations, in multiple and interrelated ways, thwart
and undermine the language and congressional purposes of Titles I and
II of BCRA."' 41 On September 18, 2004, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia effectively agreed when it ruled that
fifteen of the nineteen challenged regulatory provisions promulgated by
the Commission were invalid implementations of BCRA.
In a 157-page opinion, the district court had harsh words for the
Commission's regulations, stating, for example, that one regulation
"would create an immense loophole that would facilitate the circumven-
tion of the Act's contribution limits,"'142 another "severely undermines
136. Id. § 300.2(m) (2005).
137. Prohibited or Excessive Contributions: Non-Federal Funds or Soft Money, 67 Fed. Reg.
49,064, 49,064, 49,086 (July 29, 2002) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 300).
138. Id. at 49,083.
139. Further, apparent authority is not an adequate basis for finding an agency relationship
under the adopted regulations. Id. at 49,082. For example, if President Nixon had told his biggest
donors, "Maurice Stans is my money guy," such apparent authority would not create liability for
Stans' subsequent soft-money solicitations under the FEC regulations.
140. Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004).
141. Id. at 35.
142. Id. at 65.
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FECA's purposes" and "would permit rampant circumvention of the
campaign finance laws and foster corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption,"' 14 3 while yet another regulation "would render the statute
largely meaningless."' 44 Applying the standard articulated in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,'45 the district
court invalidated ten of the regulations on substantive grounds, and
invalidated five of the other regulations on procedural grounds such as
inadequate notice or explanation under the Administrative Procedure
Act. 146 The court upheld only four of the challenged regulations.147
In the aftermath of the district court's decision, the Commission
decided to open rulemaking proceedings with regard to a number of
those rules found deficient on procedural or substantive grounds. Nota-
bly, the FEC decided not to appeal the district court's holdings on sub-
stantive grounds regarding the Internet exceptions in the coordination
and Federal Election Activity areas and the Voter ID definition. The
Commission did, however, appeal the district court's decision 48 regard-
ing plaintiffs' standing, as well as: (1) the district court's decision strik-
ing down the coordinated communications regulation at 11 C.F.R.
§ 109.21(c)(4)(i), (ii), and (iii); (2) the district court's decision striking
down the definition of "solicit" at 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(m) and "direct" at
11 C.F.R. § 300.2(n); (3) the district court's decision striking down a
regulation governing payment of state, district, or local party employee
wages or salaries at 11 C.F.R. § 300.33(c)(2); (4) the district court's
decision striking down the de minimis exception for Levin funds149 at 11
C.F.R. § 300.32(c)(4); and (5) the district court's decision striking down
the FEC's decision that electioneering communication rules cover only a
143. Id. at 70.
144. Id. at 79.
145. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under the two-step inquiry established in Chevron, a court first
asks "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). However, if "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." Id. at 52 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
146. Shays 337 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
147. Id.
148. The Commission voted to appeal these matters by a 4-2 vote with Commissioners Thomas
and McDonald voting against an appeal.
149. Some Federal Election Activity can be paid for in part with so-called "Levin Funds," but
such activity must not "refer to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office," and must not
involve "costs of any broadcasting, cable or satellite communication, other than a communication
which refers solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office." 2 U.S.C.
§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2000 & Supp. II 2002); 11 C.F.R. §§ 300.2(i), 300.32(c)(1)-(2) (2005).
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public distribution "for a fee" at 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(3)(i). 5 °
On July 15, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion affirming the "exceptionally
thorough"'' district court's opinion "in all respects.' 52 As a threshold
matter, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that Represent-
atives Shays and Meehan had standing to challenge the FEC's flawed
regulations. The court of appeals asked, "who suffers more directly
[than the candidates themselves] when political rivals get elected using
illegal financing?"15 3 The court observed that:
[I]n a constitutional system based on the rule of law, it would be
ironic, to say the least, if Article III [of the Constitution] barred the
courthouse doors to citizens like Shays and Meehan who, because of
unlawful government action [by the FEC] may protect their interest
in election to Congress only by violating that lawmaking body's own
dictates. '
54
The court concluded, "Shays and Meehan, as regular candidates for
reelection, suffer injury to a statutorily protected interest if under FEC
rules they must compete for office in contests tainted by BCRA-banned
practices."
55
Echoing the disapproving language of the district court, the court of
appeals affirmed the district court's invalidation of all five rules and
added its own strong criticism of the rules and the Commission. With
respect to the standards for "coordinated communications," the court
commented that "it seems hard to imagine that Representatives and Sen-
ators voting for BCRA would have expected regulations like these. '' ,51
The court held that "the 120-day window offers politicians and their
supporters an unreasonably generous safe harbor" and illustrated their
concern with an example:
Under the new rules, more than 120 days before an election or pri-
mary, a candidate may sit down with a well-heeled supporter and say,
"Why don't you run some ads about my record on tax cuts?" The
two may even sign a formal written agreement providing for such
ads. Yet so long as the supporter neither recycles campaign materials
nor employs the "magic words" of express advocacy-"vote for,"
"vote against," "elect," and so forth-the ads won't qualify as contri-
150. See Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc denied, No. 04-5352 (Oct.
21, 2005).
151. Id. at 82.
152. Id. at 79.
153. Id. at 83.
154. Id. at 89.
155. Id. at 85.
156. Id. at 98-99.
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butions subject to FECA. 15 7
The court found that "by employing a 'functionally meaningless' stan-
dard outside [the 120-day pre-election period], the FEC has in effect
allowed a coordinated communication free-for-all for much of each
election cycle."' 58
With respect to the definitions of the terms "solicit" and "direct,"
the court held that the FEC's narrow definition of those terms conflicted
with the clear language of BCRA:
The FEC's definitions fly in the face of [Congress's] purpose
because they reopen the very loophole the terms [solicit and direct]
were designed to close. Under the Commission's interpretation, can-
didates and parties may not spend or receive soft money, but apart
from that restriction, they need only avoid explicit direct requests.
Instead, they must rely on winks, nods, and circumlocutions to chan-
nel money in favored directions-anything that makes their intention
clear without overtly "asking" for money. Simply stating these pos-
sibilities demonstrates the absurdity of the FEC's reading. Whereas
BCRA aims to shut down the soft money system, the Commission's
rules allow parties and politicians to perpetuate it, provided they
avoid the most explicit forms of solicitation and direction.' 59
As a result, the court affirmed the invalidation of the FEC definitions
because "Congress has clearly spoken to this issue and enacted a prohi-
bition broader than the one the FEC adopted."'
' 60
With respect to the interpretation of "electioneering communica-
tion," the court found that "the FEC's rule far exceeds any exemption
BCRA would permit."'' 6 ' The court explained:
Attempting to concoct ambiguity, the FEC protests, "There is simply
no mention of funding anywhere in the definition." True, but so
what? The already capacious U.S. Code would require even more
volumes if Congress could be clear only by ruling out every possible
limitation on statutory language. When Congress bans possession of
a firearm or cocaine, we hardly scratch our heads and ask, "Gee,
maybe they meant possession for a fee?" By the same token, when
BCRA says "made," we presume, absent compelling indication other-
wise, that it means "made" and not "made for a fee. '
The court concluded that the FEC definition "contradicts BCRA's plain
text" and "runs roughshod over express limitations on the Commission's
157. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 107.
161. Id. at 109.
162. Id. at 108 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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power, thus again flunking Chevron one."' 16 3
The court of appeals was just as critical of the other FEC regula-
tions at issue on appeal. The court found the FEC provision dealing
with the allocation rules for state-party employees "particularly irra-
tional" and "mak[ing] no sense."' 164 The court remanded the rule to the
FEC for further review, but cautioned that "[s]hould the FEC wish to
adhere to its current view in future rulemaking, it must summon more
substantial support than the conclusory assertions presented to us.
1' 65
Similarly, the court affirmed the invalidation of a Commission rule
allowing state and local parties a de minimis exemption from allocation
rules for "Levin funds." In rejecting this FEC-created exemption, the
court of appeals bluntly stated that "the record here presents no coherent
justification for the specific exemption the FEC chose."'
16 6
In conclusion, the court of appeals summarized its view of the
Commission's post-BCRA "implementing" regulations this way:
As the Supreme Court (rather fatalistically) observed in McConnell,
"[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet." Offered there as a
reason for "no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional state-
ment on [campaign finance]," this comment serves equally well here
to illustrate the importance of faithfully implementing the statute
Congress has passed. For if regulatory safe harbors permit what
BCRA bans, we have no doubt that savvy campaign operators will
exploit them to the hilt, reopening the very soft money floodgates
BCRA aimed to close. Because the rules at issue in this appeal either
fall short of Congress's mandate or lack record support showing oth-
erwise, we affirm their invalidation by the district court.
1 6 7
On October 21, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit denied the Federal Election Commission's petition
for rehearing en banc in Shays v. FEC.168 The full court's order thus let
stand the judgment of the three-judge court of appeals.
Obviously, the Commission improperly created "regulatory safe
harbors" when it failed to faithfully implement BCRA. Likewise, as we
discuss next, the Commission effectively created a "regulatory safe har-
bor" when it failed to address the proliferation of so-called "527 com-
mittees" in 2004.
163. Id. at 109.
164. Id. at 112.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 115.
167. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
168. Shays v. FEC, reh'g en banc denied, No. 04-5352 (Oct. 21, 2005).
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C. The FEC Failed to Close the 527 Loophole, and
Appeal to Congress May Be Required
In 2004, so-called "527 organizations" appeared like never before
on the election law scene. These organizations claimed their purpose
was not to influence federal elections, but rather simply to discuss issues
of the day. As a result, they argued that they should not have to register
as a "political committee" under FECA, 16 9 which allowed them to
escape the FECA limits and prohibitions regarding their receipts. At the
same time, these groups represented to the IRS that their primary pur-
pose was to influence elections which, subsequently, allowed these
groups to claim special tax status under the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC).
Having it both ways, these unregistered groups raised and spent
tens of millions of dollars in 2004 on hard-hitting communications that
attacked specific candidates but fell outside the requirements of FECA.
Indeed, one poll attributed George Bush's first lead in the campaign to
the "Swift Boat" ads attacking John Kerry. 170 Moreover, a recent study
by the Campaign Finance Institute found that a great deal of funds used
by these 527s in 2004 were well in excess of the contribution limitations
that would have applied if the 527s had not been so classified. 171 As
Senator John McCain recognized early in 2004, "so-called '527 groups'
... are raising and spending millions of dollars in the current presiden-
tial election. These groups readily admit that their intended purpose is
to influence the outcome of Federal elections."
' 172
In 2004, the Federal Election Commission had an opportunity to
address this problem but failed. Instead of making clear that these
groups must register as political committees under the Act and comply
with the law's contribution limitations and reporting provisions, the
Commission passed half-measures that failed to address the core prob-
lem. 173 With the Commission unwilling to act, the activities of these
527 organizations will continue unabated into the 2006 election cycle
and beyond. It seems clear that those wishing to address this activity
must appeal to Congress.
169. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2000).
170. Ronald Brownstein, Bush Edges Ahead of Kerry for the First Time, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2004, at Al.
171. Steve Weissman & Ruth Hassan, BCRA and the 527 Groups, in THE ELECTION AFTER
REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS AND TuE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT (Michael J. Malbin ed.,
forthcoming), available at http://cfinst.org/studies/ElectionAfterreform/pdf/EAR-527Chapter.pdf.
172. 150 CONG. REC. S4471-72 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain)
173. See discussion infra pp. 31-32.
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D. Definition of "Political Committees" in FECA and
"Political Organizations" Under the IRC
FECA essentially defines a "political committee" as "any commit-
tee, club, association or other group of persons" that receives contribu-
tions "or makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a
calendar year." 174  The terms "contribution" and "expenditure" are
defined to reach funds given or paid "for the purpose of influencing any
election for Federal office."' 175 On its face, this term "political commit-
tee" would even reach a law firm that makes a single $2,000 contribu-
tion to a federal candidate.
Nonetheless, in construing the statutory definition of "political
committee," the Supreme Court has held that the term only includes an
organization "under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of
which is the nomination or election of a candidate."' 76 Later, in MCFL,
the Court clarified:
[S]hould MCFL's independent spending become so extensive that the
organization's major purpose may be regarded as campaign activity,
the [organization] would be classified as a political committee. As
such it would automatically be subject to the obligations and restric-
tions applicable to those groups whose primary objective is to influ-
ence political campaigns.' 
77
Thus, once an organization has received more than $1,000 in contribu-
tions or made more than $1,000 in expenditures, 178 and has met the
major purpose test, it becomes a political committee pursuant to
§ 431.179
FECA requires any political committee to satisfy certain organiza-
174. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4).
175. Id. §§ 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). The term "contribution" is defined to include "any gift,
subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the
purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Id. § 431(8)(A)(i). The term
"expenditure" is defined to include "any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit,
or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any
election for Federal office." Id. § 431(9)(A)(i).
176. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
177. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
178. For years, the FEC has allowed a group whose major purpose is campaign activity or
influencing political campaigns, and that has crossed the $1,000 threshold under the statute, to
separate out and report only its federal activity to the FEC. 11 C.F.R. § 102.5 (2005). The
exception has been where allocable expenses have to be reported in their entirety and the transfers
in from non-federal accounts must be disclosed. Id. §§ 104.10, 104.17 (2005).
179. Based upon Buckley and MCFL, the Commission has stated that "[w]hen determining if
an entity should be treated as a political committee, . . . the standard used is whether an
organization's major purpose is campaign activity; that is, making payments or donations to
influence any election to public office." FEC Advisory Op. No. 1996-13 (June 10, 1996)
(emphasis added).
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tional requirements 80 and register with the Federal Election Commis-
sion."" Any organization that qualifies as a political committee must
file periodic reports of its federal election receipts and disbursements for
disclosure by the FEC to the public.' 8 2 Aside from disclosure responsi-
bilities, the most significant aspect of political committee status is the
need to operate within certain limitations in terms of contributions the
organization receives, 8 3 as well as source prohibitions.
84
By comparison, the IRC provides tax-exempt treatment for certain
income received by a "political organization," which is defined as a
"party, committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether or
not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the purpose of
directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or
both, for an exempt function." '85 "Exempt function," in turn, is defined
as the "function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection,
nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal,
State, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the
election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors."' 86  As the
Supreme Court observed in McConnell: "Section 527 'political organi-
zations' are, unlike § 501(c) groups, organized for the express purpose
of engaging in partisan political activity."' 87 The Court further noted
that 527 groups "by definition engage in partisan political activity."'' 8
Section 527 provisions cover "political committees" that report to
the FEC, committees that report to state or local election offices, as well
as some groups that register and report with no election office. In the
2000 election cycle, several notable 527 groups, actively promoting or
attacking candidates, claimed they did not have to operate under FECA
"political committee" restraints (or even state or local election law
restraints). In 2000189 and 2002,90 Congress added disclosure responsi-
bilities for the larger 527s to the extent they were not already reporting
to either the FEC or a state or local election office.
As noted, some 527 groups may claim they are "political organiza-
180. 2 U.S.C. § 432 (2000).
181. Id. § 433.
182. Id. §§ 433, 434.
183. See id. § 441a(a)(i)-(3).
184. See, e.g., id. §§ 441b(a).
185. 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1) (2000).
186. Id. § 527(e)(2).
187. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 174 n.67 (2003).
188. Id. at 177.
189. Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, § 2(a), 114 Stat. 477, 479-82 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 527).
190. Act of Nov. 2, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-286, § 6(a)-(c), (e)-(g), 116 Stat. 1929, 1933-34
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 527).
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tions" for purposes of the IRC, but not "political committees" for pur-
poses of FECA, in part to avoid the FECA limits on contributions to the
group (such as the $5,000 per year limit of § 441a(a)(1)(C) or (2)(C)).
This is particularly crucial because the new electioneering communica-
tion rules in BCRA prevent the use of corporate or union funds for cov-
ered broadcast ads, but do not put limits on donations from individuals
for such ads.' 9 ' Thus, for 527 groups that wish to focus on ads mention-
ing federal candidates, avoiding "political committee" status means
retaining the ability to take in unlimited donations from individuals.
The primary argument raised by groups attempting to avoid "politi-
cal committee" status is that the $1,000 threshold for "contributions"
received or "expenditures" made hinges on express advocacy. This is
hard to square with Buckley, which clearly applied the express advocacy
test only to groups whose major purpose is not to influence elections.
The Court confined "political committee" status to those groups whose
major purpose is influencing elections and noted that expenditures of
such groups "are, by definition, campaign related." '92 Then the Court
stated:
But when the maker of the expenditure is ... a group other than a
"political committee" . . . the relation of the information sought to the
purposes of the Act may be too remote .... [W]e construe 'expendi-
ture' for purposes of [the reporting provision applicable to persons
other than a political committee] to reach only funds used for com-
munications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate.' 93
The financial activity of 527 groups in the 2004 elections was sig-
nificant. According to a study by the Campaign Finance Institute (CFI),
"Federal 527 groups" (defined by CFI as groups that were "primarily or
very substantially involved in federal elections") spent over $398 mil-
lion on the 2004 elections. 194 In addition, these 527 groups received
$405 million in net contributions for 2004, a dramatic increase of $254
million over the $151 million such groups raised in the 2002 cycle. 1
5
Of most significance, much of the funding for these groups came from
individuals who gave far in excess of $5,000 per year.19 6 The CFI study
found that "It]he number of $100,000 [plus] donors rose from 66 in '02
to 265 in '04. The top 24 $2 million plus individual donors provided
191. See discussion supra, pp. 8-9.
192. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
193. Id. at 79-80.
194. Weissman & Hassan, supra note 171, attachments at 4.
195. Press Release, The Campaign Finance Inst., New CFI Study of "527" Groups (Feb. 9,
2005), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pr/020905.html.
196. id.
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$142 million or 56% of all individual contributions to 527s in '04." 197
The study concluded that "[i]f 527s become fully accepted and institu-
tionalized, they could play an even larger financial role in the future,
including the presidential election in 2008."'I98
E. The Thomas/Toner Proposal to Treat 527s as
Political Committees Under FECA
In early 2004, FEC Commissioners Thomas and Toner offered a
regulation proposal to address the explosion of 527 activity avoiding
FECA regulation.'99 Under the Thomas/Toner proposal, 527 organiza-
tions that crossed the $1,000 federal threshold by running ads or engag-
ing in voter mobilization activities that promote, support, attack, or
oppose a federal candidate or party would be political committees under
FECA, and therefore would have to register with the FEC and abide by
the hard dollar fundraising restrictions for their federal activity.200 If
this proposal had been promulgated by the Commission, it would have
been in place for at least the post-nomination phase of the 2004 presi-
dential election.
The first premise of the Thomas/Toner proposal was that 527s, by
virtue of their chosen tax status, can be presumed to pass the "major
purpose" test.20 1 An exception was built in for 527s that are focused
exclusively on non-federal elections, judicial selections, internal party
races, or ballot questions.20 2 The second premise was that for 527s, a
"promote, support, attack, or oppose" test, rather than the discredited
"express advocacy" test, would apply in defining "expenditure. '20 3
The proposal also would have revised the Commission's allocation
rules and required that all political committees pay for their allocable
activities using at least 50% hard dollars.20 4 Communications that pro-
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. FEC Agenda Document No. 04-44 (Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter FEC Agenda Doc. No.
04-44], available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2004/mtgdoc04-44.pdf; FEC Agenda Document
No. 04-75-A (Aug. 13, 2004) [hereinafter FEC Agenda Doc. No. 04-75-A], available at http://
www.fec.gov/agenda/2004/mtgdocO4-75a.pdf.
200. FEC Agenda Doc. No. 04-44, supra note 199; FEC Agenda Doc. No. 04-75-A, supra note
199. The "promote, support, attack, or oppose" test was borrowed from BCRA. Public
communications by state or local party committees that promote, support, attack, or oppose a
federal candidate are treated as "Federal election activity." 2 U.S.C. § 431 (20)(A)(iii) (Supp. II
2002). Moreover, in the area of "electioneering communications," the FEC may only create
exceptions that do not promote, support, attack, or oppose the referenced candidate. See id.
§ 434(f)(3)(B)(iv) (2000).
201. See FEC Agenda Doc. No. 04-44, supra note 199, at 2-3.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 4-5.
204. Id. at 9. Famously, one political committee that reportedly focused primarily on the
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moted, supported, attacked, or opposed a federal candidate would have
counted toward the long-standing "funds expended" allocation form-
ula.20 5 In May20 6 and August 207 of 2004 the Commission considered the
Thomas/Toner proposal, but the proposal failed by a vote of 2-4 with
only Commissioners Thomas and Toner voting in favor.
F. New Commission Regulations Tinker with the Problem
On August 19, 2004, four Members of the Commission passed new
rules purportedly addressing the 527 problem, albeit in a very limited
fashion. Importantly, the new rules do not rely on 527 status to deter-
mine a group's responsibility for registering with the FEC and abiding
with the contribution limits. Nor do they apply a "promote, support,
attack or oppose" test to determine what types of public communications
or voter mobilization efforts would count as "expenditures."
Instead, the rules simply revise the allocation scheme with a flat
50% federal funds minimum for non-party political committees' admin-
istrative expenses, generic voter drives, and public communications that
refer to a political party without any reference to clearly identified can-
didates.20 8 While the new rules specify that a public communication or
voter mobilization effort mentioning only federal candidates has to be
treated as a 100% federal expenditure, they also allow such efforts that
only mention non-federal candidates to be funded with 100% soft
money. 20 9 Finally, the new rules treat all money received in response to
a solicitation as a "contribution" under FECA if the solicitation "indi-
cates that any portion of the funds received will be used to support or
oppose the election of a clearly identified Federal candidate.
210
In addition to leaving a cloud of uncertainty over what types of
communications will cause a 527 group to cross over the $1,000 "expen-
diture" threshold,2 1 there are a number of other problems with the new
presidential race operated in 2004 with a 2% hard dollar, 98% soft dollar allocation split.
Editorial, Tools the FEC Already Has, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at A28 ("The existing
[allocation] formula is so visibly elastic that a major Democratic 527, America Coming Together
(ACT), is funding its activities with 98 percent soft money (unlimited contributions from any
source) and just 2 percent hard (contributions limited to $5,000, and not from corporations or
labor unions).").
205. FEC Agenda Doc. No. 04-44, supra note 199, at 4.
206. FEC AGENDA DOCUMENT No. 04-51, at 5 (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.fec.
gov/agenda/2004/mtgdocO4-51 .pdf.
207. FEC Agenda Document No. 04-77, at 9 (Aug. 19, 2004), available at http://www.fec.gov/
agenda/2004/mtgdoc04-77.pdf.
208. 11 C.F.R. § 106.6(c) (2005).
209. Id. § 106.6(f)(2)(i).
210. Id. § 100.57(a) (2005).
211. For example, is the "functionally meaningless," McConnell express advocacy test to be
used?
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Commission regulations. For example, the 50% allocation rule becomes
effective only if the 527 group in question qualifies as a "political com-
mittee" under FECA. Obviously, this rule has little impact if a group
can use an "express advocacy" test to avoid "political committee" status.
A further problem is that for political committees that truly focus most
of their message on federal candidates, a 50% federal allocation may be
too low. Unfortunately, the Commission's new regulations eliminated
the "funds expended" allocation formula that would have covered this
situation. Additionally, if the political committee is clever enough to
avoid references to particular federal candidates, but includes a reference
to a non-federal candidate, 100% of the communication or voter drive
can be paid for with soft money. Finally, a 527 group should be able to
avoid the new "contribution" test if its solicitations: (1) avoid clear sig-
nals that the funds sought will be used in the election process and (2)
avoid references to particular federal candidates. In short, the Commis-
sion may be in the same predicament it now faces, where groups claim
they are not raising "contributions" and are not making
"expenditures.'212
G. Congress Reacts with Introduction of "The 527 Reform Act"
On February 2, 2005, Senators McCain, Feingold, Lott, Lieberman,
Schumer, Snowe, Collins, and Salazar introduced "The 527 Reform Act
of 2005" designed to clarify that more 527 groups are required to com-
ply with FECA.213 The bill requires 527 groups to register as political
committees with the FEC and comply with FECA unless they raise and
spend money exclusively in connection with non-Federal candidate elec-
tions, state or local ballot initiatives, or the nomination or confirmation
of individuals to non-elected offices such as judicial positions.214 Under
this requirement, 527 groups registered as political committees with the
212. There are also two lawsuits challenging the adequacy of the Commission's new 527
regulations. On September 14, 2004, Representatives Shays and Meehan filed suit alleging that
the Commission's failure to issue new rules defining a "political committee" leaves in place "a
legally inadequate rule that fails to properly implement the law, and under which multiple section
527 groups are currently spending tens of millions of dollars of soft money plainly for the
purpose, and with the effect, of influencing the 2004 presidential and congressional elections."
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Shays v. FEC, No. 04-1597 (D.D.C. Sept.
14, 2004). Senator McCain later explained that this lawsuit hoped to overturn "the FEC's failure
to issue regulations to stop these illegal practices by 527 groups." 151 CONG. REC. S905 (daily
ed. Feb. 2, 2005).
Similarly, on September 17, 2004, the Bush-Cheney '04 campaign filed suit, alleging that the
FEC has failed to adopt any regulations setting forth clear standards for when entities organized
under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code are required to register as political committees.
See Bush-Cheney '04 v. FEC, No. 04:CV-0161 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2004).
213. S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005).
214. Id.
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FEC can use only hard money to finance ads that promote or attack
federal candidates, regardless of whether the ads expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a candidate.
Regarding the allocation rules, the 527 Reform Act Bill further pro-
vides that when a 527 group, registered as a political committee, makes
expenditures for voter mobilization activities or public communications
that affect both federal and non-federal elections, at least 50% of the
costs of such activities would have to be paid for with hard-money con-
tributions.' 15 Significantly, the Bill also provides that, with regard to the
non-federal funds that can be used to finance a portion of voter mobili-
zation activities and public communications affecting both federal and
non-federal elections, such funds must come only from individuals, and
must be in amounts of not more than $25,000 per year, per individual
donor.
21 6
Senators McCain, Feingold, Lott, Lieberman, Schumer, Snowe,
Collins, and Salazar introduced the 527 Reform Act Bill because the
FEC failed to write effective rules dealing with the 527 loophole. Com-
menting on 527 activity in 2004, Senator McCain stated:
These activities are illegal under existing laws, and yet once again,
the Federal Election Commission, FEC, has failed to do its job and
has refused to do anything to stop these illegal activities. Therefore,
we must pursue all possible steps to overturn the FEC's misinterpre-
tation of the campaign finance laws, which is improperly allowing
527 groups whose purpose is to influence Federal elections to spend
soft money on these efforts." 7
Senator McCain further stated:
This legislation would not be necessary if it weren't for the abject
failure of the FEC to enforce existing law .... The blame for this
lack of enforcement does not lie with the Congress, nor with the
Administration. The blame for this continuing illegal activity [of cer-
tain 527 groups] lies squarely with the FEC. This agency has a duty
to issue regulations to properly implement and enforce the Nation's
campaign laws-and the FEC has failed, and it has failed miserably
to carry out that responsibility. The Supreme Court found that to be
the case in its McConnell decision, and Judge Kollar-Kotelly found
that to be the case in her decision overturning 15 regulations incor-
rectly adopted by the FEC to implement the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002.218
Senator Feingold similarly commented:
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 151 CONG. REC. S887-01 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2005).
218. Id.
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Our purpose here is simple-to pass legislation that will do what the
FEC could and should do under current law, but, once again, has
failed to do. It sometimes seems like our mission in life is to clean up
the mess that the FEC has made. We had to do that with BCRA, the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which passed in 2002, closing the
soft money loophole that the FEC created in the late '70s and
expanded in the '90s. We are doing it again with the regulations that
the FEC put in place after BCRA passed. 19
IV. CONCLUSION
In the quarter century following the passage of the 1979 Amend-
ments to FECA, FEC decisions carved so many loopholes in the Act that
the law was a shell of its former self and on the verge of collapse. For-
tunately, Congress reasserted itself in 2002 and reversed many of those
harmful rulings with the passage of BCRA.
In effect for the first time in the 2004 elections, the results of
BCRA have been impressive. In McConnell, the Supreme Court
observed: "Take away Congress' authority to regulate the appearance of
undue influence and 'the cynical assumption that large donors call the
tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.' "220 After the passage of BCRA in 2002, voter turnout that
had been on the decline during the soft-money-drenched elections of
1996 and 2000 dramatically increased in 2004.221 According to a study
of the 2004 election, "voter turnout [in 2004] reached its highest level
since 1968. "222 The study pointed out that, "[v]oter turnout increased by
nearly 17 million votes and by 6.4 percentage points from the election of
219. Press Release, Senator Russ Feingold, Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on the
527 Reform Act (Feb. 2, 2005), available at http://www.feingold.senate.gov/-feingold/releases/
02/05/2005519810.html.
220. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000)). Legislative debate on BRCA specifically emphasized the need to get
more voter involvement at the grassroots level. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H339-02, 347 (Feb. 13,
2002) (statement of Rep. Pelosi) ("Today, we have an opportunity to achieve a great victory for
the American people, to bring democracy back to them .... We have an opportunity to create a
new architecture of political fund-raising in our country which devolves to the grassroots, to the
people from which power comes and where it belongs." (emphasis added)); id. at 351 (Feb. 13,
2002) (statement of Rep. Kind) ("Right now we stand on the brink of historic reform. Reform that
will put the power of democracy back in the hands of ordinary Americans. Reform that will force
politicians and political parties to get back to the grassroots level.").
221. COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE AM. ELECTORATE, TURNOUT EXCEEDS OPTIMISTIC
PREDICTIONS: MORE THAN 122 MILLION VOTE, at chart 1 (2005), http://election04.ssrc.org/
research/csae_2004_finalreport.pdf. Specifically, in 1992, the percentage of eligible citizens
who voted for President was 58.1%. Id. In 1996, this figure plummeted to 51.5%. Id. In 2000,
this figure remained at a relatively low 54.3%. Id. In 2004, the percentage jumped to 60.7%. Id.
222. Id. at 12.
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2000, the largest percentage point increase since 1952. ' '223 While there
were also other factors at work, it seems clear that BCRA played a sig-
nificant role in increasing "the willingness of voters to take part in dem-
ocratic governance ' 224 after a period of decline during the soft-money
years of 1996 and 2000.
Moreover, contrary to predictions that political party fundraising
would drop precipitously without being propped up artificially by soft
money, Republican and Democratic Party fundraising flourished in
2004. In a summary of the party financial activity for the 2004 election
cycle, the FEC found:
Republican national, state, and local committees who report to the
FEC raised $784.8 million during 2003-2004 in federally permissible
"hard money." Democratic committees raised $683.8 million. Dem-
ocratic party receipts were more than 89% higher than in the compa-
rable period during the 2000 presidential campaign, while Republican
party fundraising grew by 46% when compared with the same period.
Overall, these hard money totals for both parties' national commit-
tees were greater than their combined hard and soft money raised in
any prior campaign.225
In addition, the FEC found that "all national committees substantially
increased their contributions from individuals" 2 26-undoubtedly a result
of both parties' increased efforts to expand their contributor base. As
for state and local parties, the Center for Public Integrity reported that
when federal and nonfederal receipts are combined, such committees
raised over $128 million more in the 2004 cycle than they raised in the
2000 cycle.227
Despite these successes, however, Congress will have to continue
to serve as a court of appeals in reviewing the action and, in some cases,
inaction, of the FEC. As the Supreme Court observed in McConnell,
"the entire history of campaign finance regulation" teaches "the hard
lesson of circumvention. '228  The Court explained that because
"[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet... [there should be] no
illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement on [cam-
223. Id.
224. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144.
225. Press Release, FEC, Party Financial Activity Summarized for the 2004 Election Cycle
(Mar. 14, 2005) (emphasis added), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2005/20050302
party/Party2004final.html.
226. Id.
227. Agustin Armendariz & Aron Pilhofer, McCain-Feingold Changes State Party Spending:
Fundraising Dips, Ad Buys Plummet in First Election After Campaign Reform (May 26, 2005),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/partylines/report.aspx?aid=690.
228. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 165.
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paign finance]. 229 For example, in view of the Commission's failure to
address the 527 issue in a meaningful way, legislation will be the only
effective recourse to address this new vehicle for routing soft money
into the federal election process. As the experience of soft money
shows, loopholes will be exploited, albeit slowly at first, if left
unchecked. 3°
There is, of course, no substitute for the FEC getting it right in the
first place. But when the Commission gets it wrong, it is critical for
Congress to step in and reverse those decisions. BCRA was an impor-
tant step forward. To maintain the integrity of the statute, however,
Congress will have to serve as a court of appeals, ready to act whenever
needed.
229. Id. at 224.
230. As the McConnell Court pointed out, "[o]f the two major parties' total spending, soft
money accounted for 5% ($21.6 million) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million)
in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42% ($498 million) in 2000." Id. at 124.
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